§ The guide
What a cognitive bias test actually measures.
A cognitive bias test measures how far your judgments drift from a normative standard under specific, well-studied conditions. This one does it with behavioral tasks rather than self-report alone: you make estimates, judge probabilities, evaluate arguments, and rate decisions, and the scoring compares what you actually did with the correct answer, or with your own answer to a matched version of the same question. It covers seven biases — anchoring, hindsight, overconfidence, belief bias, base-rate neglect, sunk cost, and outcome bias — plus your Bias Blind Spot: the gap between how biased your task answers were and how biased you rate yourself. It takes about 15 minutes, runs entirely in your browser, and keeps your result only if you choose to save it.
Why self-report alone does not work
Asking "how susceptible are you to anchoring?" measures your theory of yourself, not your behavior. The methodological move that makes bias measurement possible is to put you in the situation and observe the drift. In research, anchoring is usually measured by giving one group a reference number and another none, then comparing estimates; this test does it within one person, asking each question once without a reference number and once with one. Hindsight bias is measured by asking for a prediction, revealing the outcome, and then asking what you originally predicted. Both designs are built into this assessment, which is why some questions come back a second time.
The seven biases this test measures
1. Anchoring
An arbitrary number pulls your estimate toward it, even when you know it is arbitrary. How it is measured here: you give six numerical estimates with no reference point (Phase A). Later, the same six questions return with a reference number attached (Phase B). Your anchoring score is how far your estimates moved toward the reference numbers, on average. Research anchor: Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
2. Hindsight bias
Once you know how something turned out, your memory of what you expected shifts toward the outcome. How it is measured here: you rate how likely four historical outcomes were (Phase 1). Later in the test, after the actual outcomes are revealed, you are asked to recall your own earlier ratings (Phase 2). How far your recalled ratings moved toward what actually happened is the bias.
3. Overconfidence
Confidence outruns accuracy. How it is measured here: eight general-knowledge questions, each followed by a confidence rating. Calibration is the relationship between the two — a well-calibrated person is right about 70% of the time when they say 70%. Your score is how far your average confidence ran ahead of your share of right answers.
4. Belief bias
You judge an argument as valid because you agree with its conclusion, not because the logic holds. How it is measured here: eight short logic problems in which validity and believability are deliberately crossed, so agreement and correctness come apart.
5. Base-rate neglect
Vivid, specific information swamps the underlying prior probability. How it is measured here: four probability problems that each state a base rate and a specific piece of evidence. Your score is how far your answers moved from the correct (Bayesian) answer toward the answer the evidence alone would give.
6. Sunk cost
Money, time, or effort already spent — and unrecoverable — keeps you committed to a failing course. How it is measured here: two situations, each told twice, once with money already spent and once without. Your score is how much more likely you were to go ahead when the money was already gone.
7. Outcome bias
You rate a decision as good because it worked out, ignoring what was knowable at the time. How it is measured here: four decisions, each shown twice, once with a good outcome and once with a bad one. Your score is how much higher you rated the same decision when it turned out well.
Plus: the Bias Blind Spot
Twelve self-report statements ask how susceptible you believe you are. Your Bias Blind Spot is the discrepancy between that self-assessment and your measured task performance. Pronin, Lin and Ross (2002) showed that people see bias more readily in others than in themselves, and Scopelliti and colleagues (2015) found that the size of this blind spot varies between people. Those studies compare how people rate themselves with how they rate others; this test compares your self-ratings with your own task answers.
How the assessment works
Twelve steps, seven tasks, roughly 15 minutes. The order is not arbitrary. Two of the tasks are split in half and separated by other work, because anchoring and hindsight can only be measured across a gap: you must answer once without the manipulation, do something else, and answer again with it. If you skip ahead or look back, you break the measurement — which is why the test does not let you.
Some questions will feel repetitive. They are not. The second pass is the experiment.
How your score is calculated
Each of the seven biases is scored on its own task, on a 0 to 100 scale. The scores are not percentiles: the test has no norms from a reference group. The seven scores are summarized as two plain averages on a map rather than a single number, and a set of written rules names one of six archetypes — The Anchored, The Contrarian, The Escalator, The Certain, The Calibrated, or The Variable — describing the shape of your profile, not its quality.
There is deliberately no single "rationality score." The research is genuinely divided on whether one exists: Stanovich, West and Toplak (2016) argue that rational thinking can be assessed as a whole with a broad battery; Teovanović and colleagues (2015) found the biases too weakly related to form one factor. Publishing one number would mean picking a side of an open scientific question and hiding that from you.
How to read your results
Three things worth holding onto.
Susceptibility is not intelligence. Stanovich and West (2008) found that many classic biases, among them anchoring, outcome bias, base-rate neglect and sunk cost, were largely unrelated to cognitive ability, while others, such as belief bias, were related to it. Highly intelligent people can be highly susceptible.
These are ordinary shortcuts, not defects. The biases come from mental shortcuts everyone relies on. A high score is an invitation to try the habits listed for that bias, not a diagnosis.
Your score is a snapshot. Scores on bias tasks shift with practice, mood, time of day and familiarity with the questions, and this test's retest reliability hasn't been measured. Retest in a month and expect a different number; read small changes as noise.
What you can actually do about it
The literature on debiasing is more modest than the popular literature suggests, but a few strategies have support. Consider the opposite: before committing to a judgment, explicitly generate reasons it could be wrong; in experiments this reduced overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980), hindsight bias (Arkes and colleagues, 1988) and anchoring (Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000). Take the outside view: ask what usually happens to projects like this one, rather than reasoning from the specifics of yours; this puts the base rate back into the judgment (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Pre-commit to a stopping rule before you invest: setting limits in advance reduced escalation of commitment in experiments (Simonson and Staw, 1992). Separate decision quality from outcome quality in reviews: ask what was knowable at the time, not what happened.
Limitations
This is an educational instrument, not a clinical or diagnostic one. It uses a fixed item set, so repeated testing with the same items measures partly your memory of them. Scores are 0 to 100 readings of your own answers, not percentiles or norms. The Bias Blind Spot is a discrepancy measure and inherits the noise of both components. Bias tasks in general show modest test-retest reliability, and this test's own reliability hasn't been measured, which is a reason to treat any single score as provisional.
The evidence base
The task formats come from the heuristics-and-biases literature: Tversky and Kahneman on anchoring and base rates, Evans and colleagues on belief bias, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff on calibration, Fischhoff on hindsight, Arkes and Blumer on sunk cost, and Baron and Hershey on outcome bias. The interpretation draws on Stanovich and West on biases and cognitive ability, Pronin and Scopelliti on the bias blind spot, and Teovanović, Berthet and Erceg on how individual bias measures relate to each other. Full references and scoring detail are in the methodology.