The fundamental attribution error

The fundamental attribution error (FAE) is the tendency for observers to overweight a person's internal dispositions (their personality, character, attitudes) and underweight situational factors when explaining that person's behavior. The term was coined by Lee Ross in 1977 to describe a pattern documented experimentally by Jones and Harris (1967). The classic finding: when participants read essays defending or attacking Fidel Castro and were told the essay writers had been assigned their position by an instructor, observers still inferred that the writer's “true” attitude corresponded to the position written — even though the situation (being assigned) provided sufficient explanation for the behavior.

Three qualifications matter immediately. First, the contemporary term in the social psychology literature is increasingly correspondence bias rather than “fundamental attribution error.” Gawronski (2004) argued in a paper titled “The fundamental attribution error is dead, long live the correspondence bias” that the original framing overstated both the universality of the effect and the inferential leap involved. Second, the effect shows substantial cultural moderation: Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) reviewed cross-cultural evidence showing East Asian samples are less likely to show correspondence bias than Western samples, though dispositional thinking exists across cultures. Third, the contemporary process model (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) treats correspondence bias as the result of distinct mechanisms (automatic dispositional inference plus effortful situational correction) rather than a single error.

What the term still captures usefully: people often act as if other people's behavior reflects who they are more than what their situation requires, and they often fail to make the situational corrections that would be warranted. The honest scientific picture is that this pattern is robust in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) samples, substantially moderated by culture, partially explained by cognitive-load and motivational factors, and best understood as a description of inference patterns rather than a uniform universal error.

The fundamental attribution error matters at several levels of analysis, from everyday social inference to institutional decision-making.

For social judgment. When we explain other people's behavior — a colleague snapping at a meeting, a stranger driving aggressively, a politician taking a position — we often default to dispositional explanations (they're irritable, they're rude, that's what they really believe) while underweighting situational ones (they were dealing with a family crisis, the traffic merge was poorly designed, their party requires that public stance). The asymmetry has real consequences: dispositional attributions tend to persist longer, generalize across situations, and resist updating in light of new information. Knowing about the FAE doesn't make us immune to it — the bias appears to operate substantially below the level of deliberate reflection — but it can support a habit of asking “what situational factors might be at play here?” before settling on a dispositional explanation.

For institutional decisions. Performance evaluations, hiring decisions, disciplinary actions, and judgments about “fit” all involve attribution. When a project fails, the natural inference is often that the person managing it was insufficiently skilled or committed, with less attention to the situational factors (resource constraints, conflicting priorities, organizational dysfunction) that may have made success unlikely. When an employee struggles, observers often infer dispositional limitations rather than considering whether the role, team, or environment is poorly matched. Organizations that systematically over-attribute outcomes to individuals while under-attributing them to systems tend to make personnel decisions that miss the actual causal structure.

For political and intergroup judgment. The FAE intersects with intergroup processes in characteristic ways. When members of an outgroup behave in ways we disapprove of, we often infer dispositional explanations (they're lazy, dishonest, dangerous) while explaining similar behavior by ingroup members in situational terms (they were under pressure, had no choice, were unfairly judged). This asymmetry — sometimes called the ultimate attribution error — contributes to stereotyping and the persistence of intergroup hostility. It also shapes political judgment: voters often interpret politicians' positions as reflecting their character even when the political situation (party pressure, electoral strategy, donor constraints) provides clear situational explanations.

For the field of social psychology itself. Ross (1977) initially described the FAE as “fundamental” partly because he saw it as one of the strongest empirical patterns in attribution research, and partly because he viewed the foundational task of social psychology as documenting how situations shape behavior in ways that lay observers systematically underweight. The contemporary qualifications (cultural moderation, terminological shift to correspondence bias, process-model refinement) do not undo this larger project — the situation-disposition asymmetry remains one of the most robust findings in social psychology — but they do constrain how strongly the FAE label can be deployed as a universal claim about human cognition.

The empirical foundation predates the term by a decade. Edward E. Jones and Victor A. Harris at Duke University published “The Attribution of Attitudes” in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology in 1967. The paper reported three experiments within the framework of Jones and Davis's 1965 correspondent inference theory. The most-cited experiment used the Castro essay paradigm: participants read essays that defended or attacked Fidel Castro's Cuba, written by ostensibly other students. In the free-choice condition, participants were told the writer had selected the position freely; in the no-choice condition, they were told the position had been assigned by a political science instructor. Participants then estimated the writer's “true” attitude toward Castro.

The expected finding was that participants would attribute the essay position to the writer's underlying attitude in the free-choice condition (it's a chosen statement, so it reflects the writer's views) but not in the no-choice condition (it's an assigned statement, so it doesn't). The actual finding: while choice did matter, participants in the no-choice condition still attributed the essay position to the writer's underlying attitude to a substantial and statistically significant degree. Even when participants knew the situation (the assignment) provided sufficient explanation, they made the dispositional inference anyway. Jones and Harris framed this as a puzzle within correspondent inference theory: under what conditions do observers correctly discount dispositional attributions when the situation provides explanation?

The framing as a more general “fundamental” pattern came from Lee Ross's (1977) chapter “The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process” in volume 10 of Berkowitz's Advances in Experimental Social Psychology series. Ross argued that lay observers consistently underweight situational determinants and overweight dispositional ones across many domains, not just the Castro paradigm. He named this the “fundamental attribution error” partly to emphasize how pervasive he believed the pattern to be and partly to position it as central to the broader project of social psychology — documenting situational effects on behavior that lay observers systematically miss. Jones, reflecting on Ross's framing later, considered it “overly provocative and somewhat misleading,” jokingly adding that he was “angry that I didn't think of it first.”

Joan G. Miller's (1984) work in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology was the first systematic challenge to the FAE's universality. Miller examined attribution in middle-class Hindu (Indian) and American adults and children at ages 8, 11, and 15. The finding: Americans referred more to general dispositions and less to contextual factors than Hindus did, with the cultural difference increasing developmentally rather than decreasing. The 8-year-olds in both cultures looked similar; the 15-year-olds and adults diverged substantially. This pattern was hard to reconcile with the FAE as a universal cognitive tendency: if dispositional inference were a basic feature of human cognition, it shouldn't require cultural learning to develop, and it shouldn't be cultivated more strongly in some cultures than others.

Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone (1995) in Psychological Bulletin sketched a process-model account. They distinguished four mechanisms that could produce correspondence bias: lack of awareness of the situational determinants of behavior; unrealistic expectations about how behavior should covary with situations; inflated categorizations of behavior that smuggle dispositional content into ostensibly neutral descriptions; and incomplete corrections in which automatic dispositional inferences are not fully adjusted for situational information even when that information is available. Their model integrated earlier findings including Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull's (1988) demonstration that cognitive load impairs situational correction — when observers are mentally busy, they are more likely to maintain initial dispositional inferences without adjusting for situational constraints.

Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) in Psychological Bulletin consolidated the cross-cultural literature. Their review concluded that East Asian samples (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) consistently showed smaller correspondence biases than Western samples across multiple paradigms, including direct replications of the Jones-Harris attitude attribution paradigm. They emphasized two things: the cultural difference is in relative emphasis rather than the presence or absence of dispositional thinking (Choi et al. were careful to note that dispositionism is a widespread cross-cultural mode of thought), and the difference appears to be rooted in broader cultural mentalities (analytic versus holistic) rather than narrowly cognitive differences. The 2000 Norenzayan and Nisbett synthesis in Current Directions in Psychological Science framed this as East Asians understanding behavior “in terms of complex interactions between dispositions of the person or other object and contextual factors,” while Westerners view social behavior “primarily as the direct unfolding of dispositions.”

Bertram Gawronski's (2004) paper in the European Review of Social Psychology, with its provocative title “Theory-based bias correction in dispositional inference: The fundamental attribution error is dead, long live the correspondence bias,” argued for retiring the FAE label in favor of more precise terminology. Gawronski's point was not that the empirical pattern Ross described doesn't exist — the situation-disposition asymmetry is robust — but that “fundamental attribution error” conflates several distinct phenomena and overclaims about their universality. Contemporary social psychology textbooks increasingly use “correspondence bias” for the specific inference (drawing dispositional conclusions from behavior under situational constraint), reserving “fundamental attribution error” for the broader pattern of preferring dispositional over situational explanations across many contexts.

Contemporary models treat the FAE/correspondence bias as the joint product of several mechanisms operating at different stages of the inference process. The most influential framework is Gilbert and Malone's (1995) four-mechanism account, supplemented by the two-stage temporal model from Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988).

1. Automatic dispositional inference. When observers see someone behave, they appear to make a rapid, relatively automatic inference about the person's underlying disposition. This step happens without much deliberate processing and operates on behavior as if it directly indexed character. Behavior is “here” (observable, salient, attended to); the situation is often “there” (more abstract, requiring inferential effort to characterize fully). The automaticity of the dispositional step explains why even observers who know about the FAE tend to make initial dispositional inferences before having the chance to correct.
2. Effortful situational correction. A second stage in which observers can adjust the initial dispositional inference in light of situational information. This stage is more cognitively demanding than the dispositional step, requires attention to situational details, and can be impaired by cognitive load, time pressure, or motivation. Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull's (1988) cognitive busyness work showed that observers under cognitive load made stronger dispositional inferences and less situational correction than unloaded observers — consistent with the situational correction step being effortful and resource-dependent.
3. Lack of awareness of situational forces. Observers often fail to fully appreciate how strongly situations shape behavior. The classic example is the Milgram obedience paradigm: participants in the experimental situation administered shocks they would have predicted in advance they would refuse to administer, and observers consistently underestimate the proportion of people who would comply. This is not a correction failure but an upstream perceptual failure: the relevant situational forces aren't adequately represented in the first place.
4. Inflated categorizations of behavior. The language we use to describe behavior often smuggles dispositional content. “He acted aggressively” and “he is an aggressive person” are not equivalent claims, but linguistic conventions and rapid categorization tend to convert the former into the latter. The English language has rich vocabularies for dispositions (irritable, kind, dishonest, brave) and comparatively impoverished vocabularies for situational pressures (it was a bravery-inducing situation, as Ross liked to point out, doesn't roll off the tongue).
5. Unrealistic expectations about behavior-situation covariation. Observers often have inaccurate baseline expectations about how strongly behavior should track situations. If we expect someone's behavior to be largely invariant across situations (which we often do), then variation we do see is attributed to differences in the situations being more diagnostic than they actually are, or to differences in the person that we then characterize dispositionally.
6. Cultural priming of dispositional versus contextual attention. Choi et al.'s 1999 review and the broader analytic-versus-holistic cognition literature suggest that cultural socialization shapes which features of a perceived event get attended to and weighted. Western (especially North American) cultures appear to socialize attention toward the focal object (the actor, the agent), while East Asian cultures appear to socialize more attention to relationships and context. The cultural difference operates partly at the level of automatic attention allocation, not just deliberate inference.

Two empirical observations follow from this model. First, the FAE is not a single error: it is the joint result of several mechanisms that can operate to different degrees in different situations. Second, manipulations that reduce any individual mechanism can reduce the bias. Time pressure increases it (impaired correction); explicit consideration of situational factors decreases it; cross-cultural variation correlates with attention-allocation differences; perspective-taking interventions reduce it (because they shift attention toward the actor's situational viewpoint).

The FAE has been operationalized through several experimental paradigms, each with characteristic strengths and limitations.

The attitude attribution paradigm (Jones & Harris 1967). The original measure. Participants read or hear someone express a position (typically on a controversial topic) and estimate the person's true attitude. The independent variable is whether the speaker chose the position or was assigned it; the dependent variable is the magnitude of the attitude attributed. FAE/correspondence bias is indexed by the degree to which observers attribute attitudes in the no-choice condition. This paradigm has been replicated hundreds of times, including in cross-cultural studies (which is how the cultural moderation was established). Limitations: the measure can be sensitive to participants' prior beliefs about the position (how rare a counter-attitudinal position would be) and to specific features of how the no-choice instruction is framed.

The quizmaster paradigm (Ross, Amabile, Steinmetz 1977). Participants observed a quiz-style interaction in which one person (the “questioner”) made up questions from areas of their personal knowledge and another person (the “contestant”) tried to answer them. Observers later rated the general knowledge of both. The structural asymmetry (questioners get to draw from their best knowledge; contestants are tested on someone else's) was obvious but observers still rated questioners as more knowledgeable than contestants. This paradigm shows the bias even when the situational determinant of behavioral output (who chose the questions) is fully visible.

Cognitive-load paradigms (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull 1988). Participants observe a target person under conditions designed to either fully engage cognitive resources (load) or leave resources available (no-load). The FAE is operationalized as the difference in dispositional inference between load and no-load conditions, on the theory that the situational correction step is what gets impaired under load. These paradigms are used to characterize the two-stage process rather than to establish whether the bias exists.

Cross-cultural attribution measures (Miller 1984, Morris & Peng 1994). Participants are asked to explain everyday social events (prosocial behaviors, deviant behaviors, fish-tank movements in the Morris & Peng paradigm) and their explanations are coded for dispositional versus contextual content. The dependent variable is the proportion of dispositional explanations. This measure is used primarily to document cultural differences rather than within-culture FAE magnitudes.

What the LBL Behavior Survey and Cognitive Bias Susceptibility (CBS) tool capture. The CBS tool, currently the flagship Behavior Lab tool, includes items related to attribution patterns alongside other cognitive biases. The Behavior Survey is the broader Behavior Lab hub. Neither directly replicates the Jones-Harris paradigm in a single-session online format (correspondence bias paradigms are sensitive to instructional framing in ways that are hard to replicate in self-report). What the LBL tools provide is exposure to the conceptual framework and self-reflection on attribution tendencies, useful for noticing the pattern in everyday inference even if not measuring it experimentally.

The FAE sits among several related attributional concepts that are often conflated. The distinctions matter for both academic precision and practical inference.

• vs. correspondence bias. Contemporary terminology often distinguishes these. Correspondence bias is the specific inference that someone's behavior under situational constraint reflects their corresponding underlying attitude or trait. The fundamental attribution error is the broader tendency to prefer dispositional over situational explanations across many contexts. The Gawronski 2004 paper argued for retiring the FAE label in favor of correspondence bias, on the grounds that “FAE” overclaims about universality. In practice, contemporary social psychology uses both terms, often somewhat interchangeably, with “correspondence bias” favored in the technical literature and “FAE” remaining widespread in textbooks and popular sources.
• vs. actor-observer asymmetry. The actor-observer asymmetry, formulated by Jones and Nisbett (1971), holds that people tend to attribute their own behavior to situational factors while attributing others' behavior to dispositions. The FAE concerns observers' attributions of other people; the actor-observer asymmetry concerns the differential pattern between self-attribution and other-attribution. The two patterns interact: I see my own bad mood as caused by traffic, but I see your bad mood as reflecting your character. Subsequent meta-analyses (Malle 2006 in Psychological Bulletin) found the actor-observer asymmetry to be weaker than originally claimed and largely confined to negative outcomes; the FAE/correspondence bias is more robust.
• vs. self-serving bias. The self-serving bias is the tendency to attribute one's own successes to internal factors (ability, effort) and one's failures to external factors (bad luck, situational difficulty). It's a within-self asymmetry, not an observer-target asymmetry like the FAE. Self-serving bias and FAE can compound in social judgment: I attribute my success to my abilities (self-serving) while attributing your similar success to a favorable situation (anti-correspondence, the opposite of FAE). Or I attribute my failure to a difficult situation while attributing yours to your limitations (FAE applied negatively).
• vs. halo effect. The halo effect is the tendency to let a global impression of someone influence specific judgments about their attributes — rating an attractive person as more intelligent, a likeable person as more competent. The halo effect operates across attributes of a person; the FAE operates between persons and situations. The two can co-occur (impressions formed under FAE can then halo across attributes) but they are distinct mechanisms.
• vs. Dunning-Kruger effect. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a metacognitive pattern about self-assessment of competence: people low in a domain often overestimate their performance because they lack the expertise to recognize good performance. It operates within a single judge's self-assessment; the FAE operates in cross-person inference. The two are sometimes conflated in popular discourse as “cognitive biases about other people” but they describe different phenomena at different levels of analysis.
• vs. ultimate attribution error. Pettigrew (1979) proposed an intergroup extension of the FAE: positive outgroup behavior gets attributed to situational factors, negative outgroup behavior to dispositional factors, with the reverse pattern for ingroup members. This is a context-sensitive elaboration of FAE/correspondence bias in intergroup settings rather than a separate mechanism. Subsequent literature on ingroup-outgroup attribution patterns is mixed but generally supports some version of this asymmetry, particularly under conditions of intergroup conflict.
• vs. cognitive bias (broader category). The FAE is one of many systematic departures from normative inference that fall under the “cognitive bias” umbrella. It is sometimes presented in cognitive bias lists alongside dozens of other patterns. The FAE is one of the better-empirically-supported items on those lists, with robust experimental documentation across decades, but it shares the general issue that bias lists can flatten methodological and empirical differences across very different phenomena.

Example 1 — The tense colleague

A coworker on a project team has been short and impatient in the last several meetings. She cut off two colleagues mid-sentence on Tuesday and pushed back hard on a fairly minor methodological point on Thursday. The natural inference, available to nearly every other team member, is that she's being difficult, that she has an abrasive personality, that this is just who she is under pressure.

What none of them know: she's in the middle of a custody dispute that has consumed her evenings for two months, her father was just diagnosed with a serious illness, and she got two hours of sleep last night because her younger child has been waking up at 3 a.m. with anxiety. None of these are visible at the meeting. The behavior is what's salient; the situational forces are invisible. The FAE is the team's collective tendency to settle on “she's being difficult” as the operative explanation when the situational explanation is also (and probably more strongly) operative. This is not a failure of intelligence or kindness on the team's part — the relevant situational information genuinely isn't available to them — but it is a failure to hold open the possibility that something they can't see might be doing most of the explanatory work.

The everyday-life lesson isn't “always assume there's a hidden situational explanation” (sometimes people really are being difficult) but rather “remember that you typically have access only to behavior, not to the situational forces behind it.” The asymmetry of available information is part of why the FAE is so durable.

Example 2 — The job interview

A candidate interviews for a senior role and underperforms. She seems hesitant on technical questions she should know, fumbles a presentation that her prior employer praised, and comes across as less confident than her credentials would predict. The interview panel, after she leaves, concludes that her self-presentation didn't match her resume and that she may not have been the right fit after all.

What the panel doesn't see: the candidate received news of a close family member's hospitalization an hour before the interview and chose to proceed rather than reschedule. Her hesitation on technical questions reflected divided attention rather than missing knowledge. Her presentation suffered because she had been editing it during the morning while distracted. Her confidence was eroded by an interaction with a parking attendant who had been hostile about her badge.

None of this is visible. The panel sees behavior; they don't see situation. The FAE is the panel's likely conclusion that what they saw reflects who the candidate is rather than what her morning was. The institutional consequence: hiring decisions get made on small behavioral samples that may primarily reflect situational variance rather than dispositional signal. Some interview practices (multiple panels, structured questions designed to be situationally robust, follow-up calls to address concerns) partly address this; others (single-panel, time-constrained, high-stakes interviews) tend to amplify it.

The FAE is one of the better-established findings in social psychology, but several real qualifications are worth naming explicitly.

• Cultural moderation is real and substantial. The classic FAE findings come predominantly from American college samples. Cross-cultural work consistently shows smaller correspondence biases in East Asian samples (Chinese, Japanese, Korean), and the Miller 1984 work shows Hindu/Indian samples explaining more in contextual terms than American samples. The cultural difference is in relative emphasis: dispositional thinking exists across cultures, but its weight relative to contextual thinking varies. Presenting the FAE as a universal feature of human cognition, without qualification, overstates what the cross-cultural literature supports. The pattern is robust in WEIRD samples, attenuated in many non-WEIRD samples, and absent or even reversed under some conditions.
• The contemporary literature increasingly uses “correspondence bias.” The Gawronski 2004 argument that “the fundamental attribution error is dead, long live the correspondence bias” reflects a genuine terminological shift in the academic literature. The FAE label remains widespread in textbooks and popular sources, but technical papers increasingly distinguish correspondence bias (the specific inference under situational constraint) from broader patterns of dispositional preference. Users encountering “fundamental attribution error” in different sources should know that the contemporary technical term may differ.
• The Jones-Harris attitude attribution paradigm has known boundary conditions. The effect is sensitive to the strength and salience of the situational constraint, to participants' prior beliefs about the topic, to the perceived rarity of the counter-attitudinal position, and to instructional framing. Replications generally find the basic effect, but its magnitude varies substantially with these factors. The MIT-affiliated Walker, Smith, and Vul (2015) work argued that the “FAE” in the Jones-Harris paradigm can be understood as rational Bayesian inference under particular assumptions about prior beliefs, complicating the interpretation of the bias as a clear departure from normative inference.
• Process-model refinements matter for what counts as the bias. Under the Gilbert-Malone four-mechanism account, what people call “the FAE” is actually a joint product of distinct mechanisms (automatic dispositional inference, incomplete situational correction, lack of awareness, inflated categorizations) that can dissociate. Manipulations that reduce cognitive load reduce one mechanism (correction); manipulations that focus attention on situational forces reduce another (awareness). Treating the FAE as a single uniform error obscures these distinctions and makes interventions less precise.
• Dispositional inference is often correct. The FAE describes a tendency to overweight dispositions relative to situations, not a tendency to be wrong about dispositions. People often do have stable traits, attitudes, and preferences, and dispositional inferences are often a reasonable starting hypothesis. The error is not in making dispositional inferences but in failing to adjust them sufficiently when situational information warrants. The honest characterization is “observers systematically underweight situations,” not “observers are wrong about dispositions.”
• The Milgram-style framing can overstate situationism. Ross's 1977 framing positioned the FAE as part of social psychology's broader project of documenting strong situational effects on behavior, with Milgram's obedience studies and Zimbardo's prison simulation as exemplars. Contemporary re-examinations of both studies (Haslam & Reicher's work on Milgram; Le Texier's 2019 archival work on the Stanford Prison Experiment) have complicated the simple situationist reading: participants' behaviors in those studies reflected identification, leadership influence, and motivational factors beyond raw situational power. The FAE remains a real pattern, but the dramatic situationism it was paired with in the classic literature has been substantially qualified.
• Self-help applications can overstate the implications. Popular treatments of the FAE often suggest that simply knowing about it allows you to correct for it (it doesn't; the bias operates substantially below deliberate reflection), or that “assuming positive intent” addresses it (it might, but the literature on debiasing is mixed and effects of intervention training are typically modest). The honest picture is that awareness can support a habit of asking situational questions before settling on dispositional explanations, but the bias is not eliminated by knowing it exists.

The Cognitive Bias Susceptibility tool measures susceptibility patterns across multiple cognitive biases including attribution patterns related to the fundamental attribution error. The Anxiety Test in the Behavior Lab assesses anxiety symptoms and can provide context for how anxiety states intersect with attribution patterns (anxious states tend to amplify negative dispositional inferences about both self and others). Together these tools support self-reflection on inference tendencies that the FAE describes.

The fundamental attribution error (FAE) is the tendency for observers to overweight a person's internal dispositions and underweight situational factors when explaining that person's behavior. The term was coined by Lee Ross in 1977 to describe the pattern documented by Jones and Harris (1967) in the Castro essay paradigm: observers attributed essay positions to the writer's underlying attitudes even when told the writer had been assigned the position. Gilbert and Malone (1995) developed a process-model account distinguishing four mechanisms (lack of awareness, unrealistic expectations, inflated categorizations, incomplete corrections). The contemporary terminology in the academic literature increasingly uses “correspondence bias” rather than “fundamental attribution error,” following Gawronski (2004). Cross-cultural work including Miller (1984) and Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) documents substantial cultural moderation: East Asian and Hindu/Indian samples consistently show smaller correspondence biases than American samples, though dispositional thinking exists across cultures. The pattern is robust in WEIRD samples, attenuated in non-WEIRD samples, and best understood as the joint product of distinct mechanisms operating at different stages of inference rather than a single universal error. The honest scientific picture preserves the core finding (observers systematically underweight situational forces) while qualifying its scope (cultural variation, process complexity, the contemporary correspondence-bias terminology) and resisting the popular framing that knowing about the FAE allows you to easily correct for it.

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LifeByLogic. (2026). Fundamental Attribution Error: Cultural Limits. https://lifebylogic.com/glossary/fundamental-attribution-error/

LifeByLogic. "Fundamental Attribution Error: Cultural Limits." LifeByLogic, 14 May 2026, https://lifebylogic.com/glossary/fundamental-attribution-error/.

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@misc{lblfundamentalattributionerror2026,
  author = {{LifeByLogic}},
  title = {Fundamental Attribution Error: Cultural Limits},
  year = {2026},
  month = {may},
  publisher = {LifeByLogic},
  url = {https://lifebylogic.com/glossary/fundamental-attribution-error/},
  note = {Accessed: 2026-05-14}
}